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would be an illusion. Efficient productivity is more likely to arise when
employees are operating through a union which they want to represent
them than when they are forced to accept a union which no longer has their
support. The solution seems to lie in a change in the concept of the col-
lective bargaining contract. Such a contract should run with the majority
of the employees in a given collective bargaining unit instead of with the
union obtaining the contract.3 2
H. M. F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDom OF PRESS AND RELIGION-LICENSE TAX
ON PSUOICALS--[Aizona].-Appellant was convicted of selling religious
periodicals without having paid for a license as required by municipal ordi-
nance. Held: The ordinance did not violate constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion or freedom of speech and press. State v. Jobin.1
Freedom of speech, press, and religion are protected against invasion by
state action by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
extending the restrictions of the 1st Amendment to the states. These rights
are, of course, subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's police power.2
In recent years many cases have arisen testing state and municipal power
to restrict the distribution of handbills, pamphlets, and other literature.
The requirement of a permit from a designated public official for the dis-
tribution of literature has been held to be unconstitutional as a violation
of freedom of speech and press.2 However, where the issuance of the per-
mit is non-discretionary in the public official and is merely for the purpose
of reasonable regulation and insuring obedience to the general laws, the
the existence of a contract would be effectively stifled by the contracting
union through discharges obtained by the time the contract expired, and
meanwhile disaffection would break out into industrial strife if employees
would have to deal with the employer through representatives who do not
represent them. It must be remembered that collective bargaining does not
end with the signing of a contract. Negotiation as to grievances is part of
the process of collective bargaining. The grievance machinery would sputter
and halt if the employees had no confidence in their representatives."
32. Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and How It Works (1940)
275.
1. (Ariz. 1941) 118 P. (2d) 97.
2. Davis v. Beason (1890) 133 U. S. 333 (polygamy); Ex parte Westelli-
son (1927) 38 Okla. Crim. Rep. 207, 259 Pac. 873, (unnecessary noise in
announcing contents of newspapers in selling) ; but cf. De Jonge v. Oregon
(1937) 299 U. S. 353, (criminal syndicalism); Herndon v. Lowry (1937)
301 U. S. 242 (attempt to incite insurrection).
3. Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. State of
New Jersey (1939) 308 U. S. 147; State ex rel. Wilson v. Russell (Fla.
1941) 1 So. (2d) 569; Village of South Holland v. Stein (1940) 373 Ill.
472, 26 N. E. (2d) 868, 127 A. L. R. 957; Commonwealth v. Pascone (1941)
308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522; Harder v. Shahadi (1940) 125 N. J. L.
153, 14 A. (2d) 475; Star Co. v. Brush (1918) 172 N. Y. S. 320, 104 Misc.
404. Accord: Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496; Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 128 A. L. R. 1352.
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ordinance has been upheld.4 It is also a violation of free speech and press
for the state or municipality to prohibit absolutely the distribution of liter-
ature in the public streets,5 or house to house solicitation and distribution,
or the carrying and display of placards and signs in public places.7 How-
ever, the state or town may impose reasonable regulations on these rights,
such as fixing reasonable hours for canvassing and solicitation or designat-
ing certain areas where hawkers and peddlers may stop.8 The validity
of statutes such as these, which affect solicitation of funds or distribution
of literature for religious purposes, is governed by similar principles as
respects the constitutional guaranty of freedom of religion.9
The principal case involves freedom of speech and press as affected by
the taxing power of the state. The press as such is not immune to general
forms of taxation.O However, in the case of Grosjean v. American Pr'ess,11
the United States Supreme Court invalidated a 2% tax on gross receipts
of all publications selling advertising and with a circulation of over 20,000
copies per week as a violation of freedom of the press, since it would tend
to limit the free circulation of ideas. The court was greatly influenced by
the peculiar nature of the tax and the surrounding circumstances, stating:
"It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting,
it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to,
limit the circulation of information."' 2 If the Grosjean case is interpreted
as holding that the determining factor of the validity of a tax on the
publication or distribution of literature is the tendency of the tax to limit
circulation, then any tax directly affecting the cost of publication or dis-
tribution would be invalid.'8 The method of applying the tax would be
the court's criterion in determining which taxes were too direct and which
were valid. The court in the instant case, however, interpreted the Grosjean
ease as holding that the surrounding circumstances determine the validity
4. City of Manchester v. Leiby (C. C. A. 1, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 661, cert.
den. (1941) 313 U. S. 562.
Courts may require at least an application for and a denial of the permit
as prerequisite to an injunction suit. Hannan v. City of Haverhill (C. C. A.
1, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 87, cert. den. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 81.
5. Schneider v. State of New Jersey (1939) 308 U. S. 147. See Com-
ment (1940) 25 WASHINGT O U. LAW QUARTERLY 611.
6. Schneider v. State of New Jersey (1939) 308 U. S. 147; Zimmerman v.
Village of London, Ohio (D. C. S. D. Ohio E. D. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 582.
7. Schneider v. State of New Jersey (1939) 308 U. S. 147. Accord:
Commonwealth v. Anderson (1941) 308 Mass. 370, 32 N. . (2d) 684;
Commonwealth v. Pascone (1941) 308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522.
8. Commonwealth v. Pascone (1941) 308 Mass. 591, 33 N. E. (2d) 522.
See Schneider v. State of New Jersey (1939) 308 U. S. 147, 165.
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 128 A. L. R. 1352.
But cf. Cook v. City of Harrison (1929) 180 Ark. 546, 21 S. W. (2d)
966; Commonwealth v. Anderson (1930) 272 Mass. 100, 172 N. E. 114, 69
A. L. R. 1097.
10. See Grosjean v. American Press (1936) 297 U. S. 233, 250.
11. (1986) 297 U. S. 233.
12. (1936) 297 U. S. 233, 250.
13. Mullaly v. Banks (1938) 168 Misc. 515, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 41.
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of the ordinance or statute.14 Thus if, as in the instant case, the intent
of the legislative body was merely to raise revenue and not to regulate or
limit the distribution of literature in any way, the tax would be valid.
The latter view overlooks the fact that as a practical matter many
groups may be denied the opportunity to express and circulate their ideas
freely by a tax which exceeds their individual financial resources. Since
unrestricted circulation of ideas is largely dependent upon the sale of
literature to defray the cost of publication, the suggestion of the present
and other courts that the tax may be avoided by giving the literature free
of charge' 5 is without merit. 8 Therefore it is submitted that in cases
involving freedom of speech as affected by a tax, the validity of the tax
should depend on its tendency to limit the free circulation of ideas.
D.C.
CRIMINAL LAW-APPEAL IN FORMiA PAuPnnRs OR IN PROPRIA PERSONA-
AFFIRMATVE DUTY or JuD. To INFoRm AccusED OF HIS RI iHTS-[Fed-
eral].-Within the period allowed for appeal, plaintiff, convicted under the
pandering act,' wrote a letter to the trial judge from prison stating that
he wished to appeal, that he was uncertain of the intentions of volunteer
and assigned counsel, and that he requested that these latter proceed with
an appeal in his behalf. After the time for noting appeal had expired, the
judge notified petitioner that matters of this sort must be taken care of
by counsel, and that he was forwarding petitioner's letter to counsel who
had represented him. These latter notified petitioner that they did not
care to represent him. After further correspondence, the judge called in
the former counsel and the district attorney for a conference, at which it
was decided that appellant had only a remote chance of reversal; the judge
notified the prisoner that as a consequence he did not feel justified in
appointing new counsel to prosecute an appeal. Petitioner sought habeas
corpus on the ground that the court's action deprived him of the right
of appeal in propria persona as well as by counsel, solely on account of
his poverty, which constituted an unconstitutional discrimination, rendering
his conviction, sentence, and further detention invalid. Held: Accused was
not entitled to immediate freedom on habeas corpus, since an appeal was to
be considered as taken and pending. The trial court owed an affirmative
duty to petitioner to inform him of his rights. Boykin V. Hui4. 2
The opinion of the appellate court leaves the reader in doubt as to
14. Accord: Giragi v. Moore (1936) 48 Ariz. 33, 58 P. (2d) 1249, 64 P.(2d) 819, 110 A. L. R. 314.
15. The Arkansas Supreme Court in the recent case of Cole v. City of
Fort Smith (Ark. 1941) 151 S. W. (2d) 1000, invalidated an ordinance
taxing the free distribution of literature while upholding an ordinance
taxing the sale of literature.
16. See Hannan v. Haverhill (C. C. A. 1, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 87, cert.
den. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 81. For a well reasoned opinion by a lower court
on this point see Mullaly v. Banks (1938) 168 Misc. 515, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 41.
1. (1910) 36 Stat. 833, c. 404, §3, D. C. Code (1940) tit. 22, §2707.
2. (App. D. C. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 865.
Washington University Open Scholarship
